Following the successful deployment of two-factor authentication (2FA) to more than 42 000 CERN accounts, one final step to ensure full compliance with the recommendations of the 2023 audit on CERN’s cybersecurity remains
We’ve seen in the past two Bulletins that control system cybersecurity is the black sheep of IT, a hard-to-change tanker’s course. Still, with significant daily damage of 250 000 USD for ALMA, the costs of falling to a cyberattack can no longer be ignored
While eagerly expected by experts, the first dominant incident on control systems reported by the media was the Stuxnet attack of 2010 against the Iranian nuclear programme allegedly conducted by some secret services
20 years ago, control systems used to be stand-alone systems, usually decoupled from the larger enterprise networks, using their own network cabling infrastructures and programming languages dedicated to control systems. But no more…
The main ways to get your computer infected these days are clicking on the wrong link, accessing the wrong website and/or installing the wrong software...
Unsolicited marketing and fraudulent calls are unfortunately very common nowadays. Although total protection is impossible, the CERN Telephony Service has implemented several mechanisms to reduce such annoying calls to all CERN telephone numbers
The worlds of IT and control systems have changed drastically thanks to virtualisation, containers, big data, machine learning, artificial intelligence, large language models... CERN needs to evolve towards Technical Network v3.0
With the roll-out of 2-factor authentication for the CERN Single Sign-On now concluded, the next step required by the 2023 CERN cybersecurity audit is to streamline all methods for remotely connecting to CERN
